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A REFUSAL TO PRODUCE CORPORATE DOCUMENTS:
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT'S PROTECTION OF

FORMER EMPLOYEES
I. INTRODUCTION
Many business entities have "two faces: producer of stupefying
material wealth on one side, and wreaker of financial, physical, and
environmental havoc on the other."' While many corporations operate
lawfully, some violate consumer fraud laws, product safety standards, and
environmental protection regulations.2 Corporate crimes occur when
illegal acts are "committed with the support of and for the benefit of a
corporation, organization, or other form of business enterprise."' 3 Business
entities perpetrating corporate crimes harm the United States citizenry,
government, environment, and other legitimate corporations. 4
I MICHAEL L. BENSON & FRANCIS T. CULLEN, COMBATING CORPORATE CRIME:
LOCAL PROSECUTORS AT WORK 21 (Northeastern University Press 1998).
2 See id. at 21 (contrasting societal benefits derived from law-abiding corporations
with harm produced by corporate illegalities).
3 See id. at 22 (distinguishing corporate crime from white-collar crime). Whitecollar crime is done for the individual's own benefit, whereas corporate crime is done for
the advantage of the business entity. Id.
4 See id. at 22-23. Many economists believe that corporate crime is responsible for
hundreds of billions of dollars in economic losses. BENSON & CULLEN, supra note 1, at 22.
The Savings and Loan scandal in the early 1990s, for example, typifies the drain that
corporate crime has on government resources. See Id. at 23. The government initially paid
$200 billion to rescue the insolvent institutions and anticipates spending an additional $100
to $173 billion over the next twenty years. Id. The government approximates seventy to
eighty percent of the financial strain incurred by the Savings and Loans resulted from
criminal behavior. Id. One-third of all work related deaths occur because employers
subject their employees to illegal working conditions. BENSON & CULLEN, supra note 1, at
23. The effect of corporate crime on individual lives is significant as well. See id. In fact,
of the tens of thousands of employees killed in work related occurrences, one hundred
thousand die from an illness contracted on the job. Id. Corporations, for example, once
deceived their employees into believing that asbestos was not harmful. Id. at 23-24.
Corporate crime often harms or even kills the general public. See id. at 24. Some
businesses purposely neglect to test their product's safety before they place it in the stream
of commerce. Id. Businesses routinely perform cost / benefit analyses to determine
economic feasibility of correcting defects verses legal ramifications of paying damages for
uncorrected defects. Id. Corporate crime also damages the environment. See The
Committee on Construction Law, Environmental Issues Facing Construction Contractors,
51 THE RECORD 763, 788 (1996). A national survey conducted in 1993 revealed that
one-third of the nation's businesses violated both state and federal environmental laws. Id.
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Prosecutors are focusing more heavily on corporate crime than in
previous decades because of the extensive damage that illegal corporate
activity causes.5 Although both federal and state prosecutors have
attempted to control corporate crime, it is difficult to uncover evidence of
legal infractions because businesses and corporations can effectively limit
the government's investigation into its inner-operations and confidential
decisions. 6 Even after prosecutors or investigators detect a crime, the
corporation has both the resources and power, by making frequent motions
and objections, to stall further legal proceedings.7
After suspecting that a corporate crime has occurred, prosecutors
may use several investigative techniques to obtain the information needed
to determine if a crime has been committed and by whom. 8 Specifically,
Further, half the respondents indicated they would avoid compliance until it became more
cost effective to adhere to state and federal rules. Id.
5 See KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF
ATTORNEYS AT WORK 19 (Yale University Press 1985) (describing events causing
prosecutors to more aggressively pursue corporate wrongdoers).
A study of the
prosecutors polled from jurisdictions throughout the nation revealed that 40% perceive
corporate crime as "at least somewhat serious." BENSON & CULLEN, supra note 1, at 50. In
larger jurisdictions comprised of more than 328,100 people, 75.5% of prosecutors feel that
corporate crime is at least a "somewhat serious" problem. Id. at 51. The survey also
suggests that concern is increasing because 27.9% of the country's prosecutors indicated
that the frequency of corporate prosecutions has increased while they have been with their
office. Id. at 51. Additionally, 29% of prosecutors in the United States believe that the
trend of prosecuting corporate crime will increase. Id. In large jurisdictions with more than
328,100 citizens, 58.3% of prosecutors replied that they saw an increase in corporate
prosecution during their tenure and 52.9% predicted that the number of corporate
prosecutions would rise. Id. at 53. The different prosecuting authorities, however, have
divergent views on the seriousness of corporate crime. See id. Of the District Attorney's
sampled across the country, 53.3% indicated that corporate crime was "very serious" and
44.6% believed it to be "somewhat serious." Id. at 55. State Attorney Generals did not feel
that corporate crime was as great a problem as their District Attorney counterparts, given
only 20% of them believed that it was "very serious" and 36.3% felt that it was "somewhat
serious." Id. The United States Attorneys were the least concerned with corporate crime,
with as few as 13.3% responding that the problem is "very serious" and 10.5% believed that
corporate crime was "somewhat serious." Id.
6 See BENSON & CULLEN, supra note 1, at 26-27.

Corporations often stymie both

prosecutors' and investigators' ability to uncover important evidence indicating that a
corporate crime has been committed. Id. at 27. For example, business entities may bury
critical evidence in stacks of documents and folders hindering its discovery. Id. Even if
prosecutors knew what they were looking for, oftentimes finding it would exceed their
investigative ability. Id. In fact, a national survey of prosecutors revealed that 20.6%
thought that a lack of investigative personnel would "definitely" reduce their desire to
prosecute corporate crime, while 39.7% said that it would "probably" diminish their
willingness to prosecute. Id. at 80. Moreover, once the government establishes that a crime
has been committed, they need to begin the daunting process of determining which
corporate employees are culpable. BENSON & CULLEN, supra note 1, at 27.
Id.
8 Id. at 70. These methods include interviewing, searching financial records,
subpoenaing witnesses to the grand jury, examining documents, analyzing confidential
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prosecutors often subpoena corporate documents and employee testimony
before the grand jury in order to discover information essential to building
a case.9 In an attempt to continue concealing criminal activity and hinder
the government's criminal investigation, corporations have tried evoking
their Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination to shield
themselves from subpoenas to produce information.' 0 The Supreme Court,
however, has eroded the corporation and its employees' ability to refrain
from producing information."1
This Note will discuss how the Fifth Amendment applies to former
employees who possess documents that the government subpoenas. The
History section will trace the evolution of the Fifth Amendment protection
against self-incrimination, focusing primarily on the compelled disclosure
of incriminating corporate documents or testimony. Next, the Facts section
will describe the nature of the current federal circuit split questioning
whether former employees can claim a Fifth Amendment privilege while in
possession of corporate documents. The Analysis section will compare the
Eleventh Circuit, D.C. Circuit, and United States Bankruptcy Court's
extension of the Braswell rule to former employees with the Second, Third,
and Ninth Circuits, which have declined to extend the Braswell rule to
former employees. Finally, this Note will conclude that the Braswell rule
should apply to all former employees by compelling the production of
corporate documents in their possession.
II. HISTORY
The first recorded case in which anyone invoked his or her privilege
against self-incrimination occurred in 1532 during the trial of John
Lambert.' 2
During the course of the inquisition, the Archbishop
information, looking at computers, and obtaining a search warrant. Id.
9 Id. at 70. Approximately 54.1% of prosecutors participating in a national survey
found that a grand jury subpoena was a "very useful" technique, and 31.2% believed that
this method of discovery was "somewhat useful." BENSON & CULLEN, supra note 1, at 70.
'0 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (discussing officer
who invoked his Fifth
Amendment rights with respect to corporate documents); Wilson v. Unites States, 221 U.S.
361 (1911) (discussing officer who invoked his Fifth Amendment rights with respect to
corporate documents); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478 (1913) (discussing officer
who invoked his Fifth Amendment rights with respect to corporate documents); Bellis v.
United States, 417 U.S. 94 (1974) (discussing officer who invoked his Fifth Amendment
rights with respect to corporate documents); Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988)
(discussing officer who invoked his Fifth Amendment rights with respect to corporate
documents).
11 See generally Hale, 201 U.S. at 43; Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976);
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1983); Braswell, 487 U.S. at 99.
12 LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST

SELF-INCRIMINATION 62 (1968).

Lambert was an English priest whom the Archbishop

accused of heresy because he suspected Lambert had converted to Protestantism. Id. at 3.
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interrogated Lambert, forcing him to respond to forty-five charges
designed to elicit his theological beliefs.' 3 Lambert refused to answer the
first question posed to him, thereby, defying the judges.' 4 Lambert refused
to take the Star Chamber Oath, which would compel him to respond5
truthfully because he believed that he was not properly implicated.'
Instead, he asserted his right not to accuse himself of any offense for which
he could later be punished. 16
The Star Chamber Oath, used regularly to coerce confessions, had a
further challenge made to it during the trial of John Lilburne. 17 The court
charged Lilburne with shipping seditious books from Holland into England
after two of his associates implicated him.' 8 The prosecutor's chief clerk
questioned Lilburne in an effort to gain evidence to convict him.' 9 Since
the Government did not allow Lilburne to face his accusers, he refrained
from answering any questions. 2 The Attorney General was also unable to
13 Id.

The Archbishop used an oath developed in 1246 which compelled the
defendant to answer any question submitted to him truthfully. Id. at 47-49. This oath was
later called the Star Chamber Oath because the court utilizing it tried its cases in a chamber
with stars painted on the ceiling. Id. at 49. The Star Chamber Court sought to have the
accused declare their guilt from their own lips, rather than from hearing incriminating
statements from others. Andersen v. Mar'land,427 U.S. 463, 471-72 (1976).
14 See LEVY supra note 12, at 3. The Court inquired whether he had ever previously
been suspected of heresy.
"5 Id. at 4.
16 Id. Lambert stated that "[n]o man should be bound to bewary [sic] himself." Id.
By this he meant that he should not be forced to admit crimes that were not already known
to, or proven by the inquisitors. Id. at 62. Despite his zeal, the State burned Lambert at the
stake in 1537 for heresy. LEVY supra note 12, at 62.
17 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 459 (1966)(discussing origins of privilege
against self-incrimination). See also LEVY supra note 12, at 271 (discussing Lilbume's
unwillingness to testify against himself). Lilbume's trial drew public attention to the
court's practice of requiring a person to be a witness against himself. LEVY, supra note 12,
at 271.
18 LEVY, supra note 12, at 273. The state was confident that Lilburne would be
convicted because Sir John Banks, the Attorney General prosecuting the case, had secured
confessions under oath that Lilburne had been involved in importing banned books. Id.
19 See LEVY, supra note 12, at 271. Lilburne admitted that he had been to Holland
and seen both the books and men the chief clerk had inquired about, but maintained that his
response was irrelevant to the charge of shipping prohibited books into England. Id.
Lilburne told the chief clerk that he was not:
imprisoned for knowing or talking with such and such men, but for sending over
[b]ooks; and therefore I am not willing to answer any more of these questions,
because I see that you go by this [e]xamination to ensnare me: for seeing the
things for which I am imprisoned cannot be proved against me, you will get other
matter out of my examination.
Id.

20

Id. Lilburne's motive for his silence stemmed from the "fear that with [his] answer

[he] may do [himself] hurt." Id. His statement was made to invoke the protection under
English law that would shield him from incriminating questions, which had no relevance to
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When Lilburne went to the Star

Chamber for his trial, the justices attempted to administer the Star
Chamber Oath.22 Lilburne, however, refused to recite the Oath because he
was concerned that the court's motive was to use his own answers to draft
the charges against him. 23 The court held him in contempt and imprisoned
him. 24 The court continuously summoned Lilburne from jail and sent him
back because he persisted in his refusal to answer the charges under the
Star Chamber Oath.25 Since Lilburne failed to swear under oath, the court
found him guilty for contempt.26 The press reported on the Government's2 7
treatment of Lilburne and when Parliament reconvened, it freed him.
Parliament quickly abolished the Oath and replaced it with the protection
against self-incrimination because of Lilburne's efforts.28 Soon after
Parliament abolished the Oath, the English citizenry generally accepted the
protection against self-incrimination and it became a tenet of common
law.2 9

When the American colonists traveled from England to the New
World, they brought the notion of not bearing witness against one's self
with them.3 ° On June 8, 1789, James Madison, while serving in the first
Congress, proposed
what would become the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution. 3' The Amendment, in part, protected citizens from having to

the charge of sending seditious books into England. LEVY, supra note 12, at 271.
21 Id. As a result of his uncooperative responses, Lilburne was jailed for two weeks.
Id.
22 Id. at 274. In addition to inadequate access to counsel and failing to state the exact
charges, the court demanded Lilburne to take an oath to answer all questions asked of him
truthfully. Id.
23 Id. at 275.
Lilburne explained his opposition to the oath by stating: "[alnother
fundamental right I then contended for, was, that no man's conscience ought to be racked by
oaths imposed, to answer to questions concerning himself in matters criminal, or pretended
to be so." Miranda,384 U.S. at 459.
24 LEVY, supra note 12, at 275.
25 See LEVY, supra note 12, at 275-76. The court seemed more concerned that
Lilburne would not take the oath than the actual charges of sedition. id.
26 Id. at 276. Lilburne asserted that he was found guilty for refusing to incriminate
himself and not for the crime of Sedition. Id. As punishment for his defiance, the court
made Lilburne walk two miles while guards whipped him with almost every step he took.
Id. Further, the court added torture and an extension to Lilburne's sentence when he
sermonized to the public about his plight during his two-mile walk. Levy, supra note 12, at
276.
27 Id. at 278-79.
28 Id. at 282. Parliament gave Lilburne repartitions to compensate for the harm done
to him by the court. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 459.
29 LEVY, supra note 12, at 281.
30 id.

31 See LEVY, supra note 12, at 422. The Fifth Amendment states,
[nlo person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
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disclose information to the state that would implicate them in the
commission of a crime.32 Madison intended that the Amendment set a high
standard of conduct for the federal government when it interacted with its
citizens.33 He and his colleagues feared that the government, in exercising
its power, could oppress its citizens.34 Thus, Madison sought to ensure that
the newly formed35United States government protected its citizens from
self-incrimination.
Madison's prediction that the courts would vigorously protect the
privilege against self-incrimination has come to fruition.36 The Supreme
Court has developed an array of policies supporting the right and has
decided several cases interpreting it. 37 The Court has held that the
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of war or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791. The Bill of Rights: A Brief
History, ACLU Briefing Paper # 9, at http://www.aclu.org/library/pbp9.html (last visited
Januar? 20, 2001).
See LEVY, supra note 12, at 422.
33 Id. Madison believed that if the Fifth Amendment was incorporated into the
Constitution, the United States courts would more thoroughly scrutinize any infringements
of the individual rights by the other branches of government. Id.
34 Id. at 430. The framers were cognizant of even the most minute of the
government's invasions of individual liberty. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 459
(1966); see also Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) (discussing how easily
unconstitutional practices can infiltrate democratic practices). The framers were so resolute
in creating amendments because they believed that illegitimate, tyrannical laws would get
their foothold unnoticed by subtle divergences from the current procedure. Miranda, 384
U.S. at 459.
35 See LEVY, supra note 12. at 430. The Supreme Court has suggested that the
privilege protecting self-incrimination is essential to prevent the reoccurrence of the Star
Chamber trials and Oath. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973).
36 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635.
See also Couch, 409 U.S. at 328 (Court reiterates
importance of Fifth Amendment's prohibition of inquisitors forcing witnesses to speak
against their will). The Court asserted that its role was to safeguard an individual's right to
be free from self-incrimination because the magnitude of running a state may divert the
legislature's attention. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635. The Court is also in a better position to
detect whether a law that violates the Fifth Amendment because it reviews the law after it
has been in operation and had an affected people's lives. Id.
37 See e.g. Hale, 201 U.S. 43; Bellis, 417 U.S. 85; Miranda, 384 U.S. 436; Braswell,
487 U.S. 99. The courts have articulated the policies behind the self-incrimination clause
as:
an unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of selfaccusation, perjury or contempt; [a] preference for an accusatorial rather than an
inquisitorial system of criminal justice; [a] fear that self-incriminating statements
will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; [a] sense of fair play which
dictates 'a fair state- individual balance by requiring the government ... in its
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privilege against self-incrimination is personal, protecting the individual
and not the information.38 In Boyd v. United States,39 the Court expanded
the Fifth Amendment personal privilege to include shielding people's
private records, papers, or books from use against them.4° The Boyd Court,
which extended the Fifth Amendment privilege to individuals' private
written communications with others, reasoned that the protection was
necessary to prevent potential coercion in forcing witnesses to provide
written evidence against themselves. 4' Boyd's protection did not apply to
all papers, but rather, the constitutional safeguard depended on the nature
of the documents subpoenaed and who had possession of the documents.4 2
Hale v. Henke 4 3 eroded the Boyd protection by creating the
collective entity rule. 44 Hale differentiated an individual's private
contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load,' . . [a] respect for the
inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual 'to a
private enclave where he may lead a private life'...
Couch, 409 U.S. at 328 (quoting from Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378
U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
38 Couch, 409 U.S. at 328; Hale, 201 U.S. at 69-70.
'9 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
40 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631-32 (1886) (holding invoices of seized

items could not be used against owners in suits of forfeiture). See also In re Three Grand
Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated January 29, 1999, 191 F.3d 174, 176-77 (describing
Boyd, 116 U.S. 616). The Boyd Court stated,
any compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath, or compelling the
production of his private books and papers, to convict him of crime, or to forfeit
his property, is contrary to the principles of a free government. It is abhorrent to
the instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It
may suit the purposes of despotic power, but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere
of political liberty and personal freedom.
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 631-32.
41 See Boyd, 119 U.S. at 634-35 (holding that both written documents and
oral
testimony protected by the Fifth Amendment). See also In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas
Duces Tecum Dated January 29, 1999, 191 F.3d at 177 (describing Boyd, 116 U.S. 616).
42 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 631-32 (forbidding compelling private individuals from
producing their private books). The privilege only applied to documents that were both
private and in the possession of the person claiming the privilege. Id. Ownership of the
papers, alone, is insufficient to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. The privilege
holder must also have actual possession of the papers. Couch, 409 U.S. at 330 (holding
defendant needed accountant to produce papers she had title to but not control of). The
Court has recognized some instances where there was clearly constructive possession, or
that the absence of control was only momentary and irrelevant so as to leave the
defendant's Fifth Amendment rights in tact. Id. at 333.
4' 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
44 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75-6 (1906) (holding that corporate officers
cannot exercise Fifth Amendment privileges on behalf of corporate entity). While the Court
recognized that Boyd was still good law, it made a distinction when the person holding the
documents was a corporate employee. Id. at 73-4.
There is a public duty to keep
documents related to the business in the business offices. Wilson v. Unites States, 221 U.S.
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documents from the records of a public corporation. 45 This distinction
prevented the Court from extending the protection against selfincrimination to corporations because they are created by statute to benefit
the public, and not any one person. 46 The intent of the Fifth Amendment is
to protect individual liberty, not the fiscal interests of corporate and
unincorporated organizations.47
In Wilson v. United States,48 the Court considered documents public
even when a specific person in the corporation is charged. 49 The Wilson
Court ruled that the president of the corporation held the books as a part of
his obligation as corporate officer. 50 Neither the corporation, nor it
president, can withhold records to save themselves from their respective
roles in the illegality. 5' The Court held that the conduct of the officer
361, 380 (1911). The government has the right to inspect documents at any time to ensure
that the officers and businesses are correctly executing their duties. Id.
45 Hale, 201 U.S. at 74. An individual has the unrestricted power to contract the
constitutional protection of a citizen, the freedom of conducting their business in the
manner that they choose. Id. Since the individual does not receive any benefits from the
state, they do not have reciprocal duties either to the state or neighbors, to give information
that would incriminate themselves. Id.
46 Id. The state and federal governments have sovereignty and control over a
corporation because the corporations can only operate after the state approves it. Id. For
example, the government can restrict a corporation by ensuring that it only makes contracts
that are consistent with the terms of its charter. Id. The state can also deprive a corporation
of its franchise if it violates the terms of its creation. Id. at 74-75. To ensure that the
corporation stays within its proscribed limits, the legislature has the inherent right to
examine its records and contracts. Id. at 75.
47 Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91 (1974). Had the Fifth Amendment
intended to protect public organizations, the government would be ineffective in any
attempts to regulate the organizations because the majority of evidence is derived from
records or documents. Id. at 90.
4' 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
49 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384 (1911); see also Braswell, 487 U.S. at
105-6. The letter-press copy book requested in the subpoena was kept by the president of
the United Wireless Telegraph Company in his office. Wilson, 221 U.S. at 368. The
prosecution charged both the president and the corporation with fraudulent use of the mails
and conspiracy. Id. at 367. The president exclusively used the book and it contained both
business and personal correspondence. Id. at 368. The Court noted that adding personal
details in the book did not make its contents private. Id. at 378. The Court did recognize
that the president did not have to submit the personal correspondence that was unrelated to
the business. Id. The Court, however, rejected the president's argument that he should be
exempt from producing the corporate books because he both wrote the incriminating
information and it would be used against him personally. Id. at 378.
50 Wilson, 221 U.S. at 384. A Corporation can only act through its agent because it is
an artificial entity. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 90. As a part of their fiduciary responsibility to the
corporation, the custodian takes on a representative function, which obligates the custodian
to produce the corporate records requested in the subpoena. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 110.
Therefore, any claim of a Fifth Amendment privilege would amount to asserting it on
behalf of the corporation, which is not privy to the protection since it is not a person. Bellis,
417 U.S. at 90.
51 See Wilson, 221 U.S. at 382 (holding that corporate officers must surrender official
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holding the books or records was irrelevant in determining whether the
corporation needs to surrender the materials to the state.52
In Wheeler v. United States,53 the Court ruled that books do not
become private just because the corporation disbands. 54 The Court rejected
the officers' argument that the books and journals were private property
because they were no longer officers of the corporation.55 The Court ruled
that the material did not change its nature when given to the defendant and
his partner.56 The Wheeler Court deemed the records "public" and did not
allow the former partners to invoke the Fifth Amendment's protection.57
Moreover, individuals whose function is to represent a collective
group do not privately hold any documents stemming from their duty. 58 In
United States v. White,59 the Court considered documents from collective
agencies, such as unions, as public, rather than private, because members
can view documents upon request and even take legal action when leaders
decline their demands. 60 In the case of a union, the officers could not
documents even if its contents personally incriminate them); Braswell, 487 U.S. at 110
(summarizing Wilson's holding). The state's power to review corporate books to ensure
that the corporate entity is complying with the terms of its charter would be impaired or
destroyed if the culpable officer holding the books could assert their privilege to prevent the
record's inspection. Wilson, 221 U.S. at 384-85.
52 Id. at 385. The Court held that "the visitorial power which exists with respect
to
the corporation of necessity reaches corporate books without regard to the conduct of the
custodian." Id.
5' 226 U.S. 478 (1913).
5"4 Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489-90 (1913).
The grand jury
subpoenaed the books, records, and journals from Wheeler and Shaw, Inc. to investigate
whether the corporation used the mail to defraud customers. Id. at 482-83. The corporation
went out of business a year prior to the issuance of the subpoena and all the books and
records relating to the defunct corporation were transferred to the defendant and his
business partner. Id. at 486-87.
" Id. at 489-90.
56 Id. Though the corporation was defunct, the Court allowed the grand jury
to
inspect the books because they were kept during its operation. Id. at 490. The privilege
does not protect "individuals against self-incrimination in the production of their own books
and papers [or] prevent the compulsory production of the books of a corporation with which
they happen to be or have been associated." Id.
57

Id.

" U.S. v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944). The organization needs to be more than
"an informal association of individuals" in order to constitute an independent entity. Bellis,
417 at 92-93. One hallmark of an organization having a separate and independent identity
from its members is a specific set of organizational records which its members have the
right to access. Id. at 93.
Representatives of a collective group have the same
responsibilities as officers of an organization created by the state for the benefit of the
public. Id. In such an organization, the officers hold the documents in a representative
capacity rather than a personal one. Id. The representatives of the collective group,
therefore, cannot assert any personal privilege under the Fifth Amendment even it the
documents would incriminate them. Id.
5' 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
60 U.S. v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944). When the collective organization is a
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claim a Fifth Amendment privilege because the Court treated the
organization like a public entity.6 '
Further, the Court held that size was not a factor in determining
whether a partnership is a public entity.
In determining that the
partnership was public, the Bellis Court considered whether the identity of
the partnership differed from that of the individual partners. 63 If 64the
partnership is impersonal, then it cannot claim relief from the subpoena.
In Fisher v. United States6O and United States v. Doe,66 the Court
shifted its standard of analyzing both the possession and content of the
documents subpoenaed to considering whether the production of the
information was testimonial. 67 Both Fisher and Doe considered whether
the incriminating contents of the documents were privileged and whether
68
the actual action of submitting the documents was compelled testimony.
union, as in White, its members could only endorse activities that the union can do lawfully.
Id. at 702. The union also owned its own real estate, official union books and records are
separate from personal records, and the union treasury was segregated from the bank
accounts of its individual members. Id. The union accounts could not be used by officers
or members in to further criminal activity or for private use. Id Additionally, members are
not held criminally or civilly responsible for union officers' misconduct unless they were
personally involved in the illegal action. Id.
61

Id. at 705.

62 Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100; see Braswell, 487 U.S. at 108 (summarizing Bellis).
The

Court determined that a three-person law firm partnership was not private enough so that
the partner could assert his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination to
withhold records in his possession. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 101. The senior partner kept the
records in his office until he left the firm. Id. at 86. Upon accepting a new job, the records
remained with the two remaining lawyers, as a part of their new partnership, until the
former senior partner requested the documents be moved to his new office. Id. A subpoena
was issued for the former senior partner to bring all records relating to the firm. Id. The
partner refused to produce the documents, claiming that they were private records. Id.
63 Id. at 95. The Court concluded that the firm was not a private organization
which
could benefit from the Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. The Court based its finding on the
following criteria; it was an established institution which practiced for fifteen years, it had
an independent structure giving each partner the opportunity to vote on the management of
the firm, it had a special bank account bearing the firm's name, it had official firm
stationery, and its employees worked for the firm and not themselves. Id. at 96-97. The
Court also pointed out that the former senior partner had a fiduciary obligation to only use
the books for partnership business. Id. at 98.
64 Id. at 100.
6 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
66 465 U.S. 605 (1983).
67 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976) (holding
no Fifth
Amendment violation to require attorney to produce tax documents prepared by
accountant); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 614 (1983) (finding the Fifth Amendment
would be violated if production of documents were required); see also Braswell, 487 U.S. at
109 (discussing Fisherand Doe). The Court began moving from a collective entity rule to a
compelled-testimony analysis. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 109. The collective entity rule,
however, survived the shift in analysis. Id.
68 Doe, 465 U.S. at 610-13; Fisher,425 U.S. at 405-13.
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The Courts held that there was no Fifth Amendment privilege to the
documents' content because the defendant created it willingly and without
coercion. 69 The Fisher Court recognized that in addition to the information
in the document itself, the mere act of surrendering documents could be
communicative.7 0 Although supplying the papers would have the effect of
admitting to the existence, control, possession, and authentication of the
documents, the Fisher Court concluded that the Fifth Amendment would
not protect inferences based on the admission of the documents. 7'
Additionally, Fisher stated that the act of producing documents does
72 not
require the possessor to say anything that would incriminate himself.
The Court articulated its current policy in Braswell v. United
Statesv3 determining that the Fifth Amendment does not protect the
custodian of the records from production of subpoenaed documents.7 4 The
69

Doe, 465 U.S. at 611; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409-10. Fisher concerned a taxpayer

who gave his forms to an accountant to fill out. Fisher,425 U.S. at 393-4. The information
was then transferred to a lawyer. Id. at 394. The government subpoenaed the information
from the lawyer after determining that there was no attorney-client privilege. Id. at 394-5.
Fisher held that the lawyer could not assert an attorney-client privilege on behalf of the
client-taxpayer because the accountant made the records. Id. at 409-10. The taxpayer in
Fisher voluntarily had the records created because he hired an accountant to generate the
documentation based of his tax information. Id. The Court, however, declined to extend its
holding to taxpayers that have their forms in their possession. Id. at 414. Unlike Fisher,
the Court in Doe, determined it was irrelevant that the records were in the sole practitioner's
possession, since he had voluntarily written the incriminating information in the course of
doing business. Doe, 465 U.S. at 612. Thus, Doe extended the concept created in Fisher
determining that the Fifth Amendment does not protect the contents of a document when
the individual that compiled it did so on his own accord. Id.
70 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410.
The issue in Fisher was whether the actual action of
handing over documents would sufficiently incriminate the custodian to violate the Fifth
Amendment. Id.
71 Id. at 411. The production of documents would only be insignificantly "testimonial
and incriminating." Doe, 465 U.S. at 613. Additionally, relinquishing records would
contribute very little to the government's case against the custodian because the existence
and location of the documents are already known. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411. Admitting to
having the information does not harm the possessor since the government is not using the
document to show to the holder's "truth-telling" ability. Id. The Court also found the
production of the documents only reveals the holder thinks the documents produced are the
same in the subpoena. Id. In order to legitimately claim Fifth Amendment protection, a
holder "must be confronted by substantial and 'real,' and not merely trifling or imaginary
hazards of incrimination." Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968).
72 Fisher, 425 U.S. 411. The records are ordinarily given voluntarily and without
coercion. Doe, 465 U.S. at 609. Fisher holds that the taxpayer is not sufficiently
threatened by what might be communicated by his act of handing over the documents.
Fisher,425 U.S. at 412. Doe, conversely, did not overturn the lower court's decision that
the sole practitioner may be incriminating himself by the act of complying with the
subpoena. Doe, 465 U.S. at 613-4.
7' 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
74 Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 100 (1988). In Braswell, the subpoena was
issued for the president and sole shareholder of two corporations in Mississippi. Id. at 101.
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Court integrated the Doe! Fisher line of cases with Hale and its progeny in
developing its rationale for extending the collective entity doctrine.75 First,
the Court reasoned that a custodian's production of documents was not
"testimonial communication." 76 Second, the custodian, as an agent of the
corporation, waives his right to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege.7 7
While the Court acknowledged that either theory would yield the right
result, the majority was more supportive of the latter reason, thereby
preserving the collective entity rule. 78 The policy behind compelling
custodians to produce corporate records is that law enforcement agencies
would be significantly impaired in their attempts to prosecute white-collar
crimes. 79 Both the corporation and the individual wrongdoer would
unjustly benefit from the protection of the Fifth Amendment if allowed to
assert the privilege. 80 Additionally, a corporate privilege would weaken
the state's powers to regulate the entity. 8
The Braswell Court, however, recognized that the act of production
could be considered communicative, thereby creating a possible ancillary
effect of incriminating the document holder. 82 To prevent the potential
self-incrimination that may occur when a custodian relinquishes
subpoenaed documents, the Court prohibited the government from using
the custodian's individual act of production against him, though it could
still use the contents of the documents at his/her trial.83 The Court held
that during the custodian's trial, the jury would not be told that he or she
produced the records, severing a connection from the defendant to the
documents. 84
The subpoena requested the documents to be delivered by the president, personally, or
through another corporate custodian. Id. The two companies which were active in
commerce, filed corporate tax returns, and kept an accounting of its business. Id. The
corporate president refused to submit the documents requested claiming it would violate his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Id.
75 Id. at 113. Compare Hale, 201 U.S. 74 (holding that employees of corporations
cannot claim Fifth Amendment's protection) with Doe, 465 U.S. at 613-14 (focused on
whether production of documents would be testimonial) and Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408
(focused on whether production of documents would be testimonial)
76 Braswell, 487 U.S. at 101.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 109
79 Id. at 115. At the time of the decision, white-collar crime was considered the most
severe and encompassing problem facing the nation. Id. The Court held majority of the
evidence of corporate wrongdoing is contained in the documents. Id.
80 Id. at 115-16.
"' Id. at 116.
82 Braswell, 487 U.S. at 117-18.
Producing the records should be viewed as a
corporate act because the custodian is acting as an agent of the business and not
individually. Id.

Id. at 118.
84 Id. However, the jury may draw reasonable inferences as to the authenticity of the
83

records and the defendant's connection to the records. Id. The Court explicitly declines to
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III. FACTS
The history of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
has emphasized the importance of distinguishing between private and
corporate document holders.85 Though the Supreme Court has eroded
some of the protection established in Boyd, the Court has avoided any
holding that would compel a private citizen in possession of incriminating
papers from using them against him or herself. 86 No Supreme Court case
exists that addresses whether the Braswell rule would apply to situations
where the holder of corporate documents is a former employee of the
company. The circuits are currently split on whether to extend the Fifth
Amendment privilege to former employees.87
IV. ANALYSIS
A. CircuitsExtending Braswell to FormerEmployees
The Eleventh Circuit, D.C. Circuit, and the United States
Bankruptcy Court have extended Braswell to former employees, requiring
employees to submit papers subpoenaed by the government.88 The Court's
decisions beginning with Hale and concluding with Braswell suggest that
the corporate entity rule should also apply to former employees. 89 First,
former employees cannot claim the Fifth Amendment's protection because
decide whether a custodian should be compelled to produce records when he is the sole
employee of the corporation and the jury could only conclude that the defendant made the
document. Id.
85 Compare Braswell, 487 U.S. at 114 (holding that corporate officers
cannot claim
right against self-incrimination) with Boyd, 116 U.S. at 631-32 (holding that private citizens
can utilize privilege against self-incrimination). The corporate custodian has no privilege,
whereas the private individual in possession of his own papers is protected by the Fifth
Amendment. See id.
86 See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 118 (declining to decide whether submitting evidence
communicative for one-employee corporation); Fisher,425 U.S. at 414 (declining to decide
whether individual taxpayers would be compelled to produce them).
87 See In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated January 29, 1999,
191
F.3d 174, 183 (2d. Cir. 1999) (indicating split in circuits); United States v. McLaughlin, 126
F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that Braswell does not apply to former employees); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 71 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that Braswell does not apply
to former employees); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated November 12, 1991, 957 F.2d 807
(11 th Cir. 1992) (holding that Braswell applies to former employees); In re Sealed Cases
(Government Records), 950 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that Braswell applies to
former government employees).
88 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated November 12, 1991, 957 F.2d 807 (holding
that Braswell applies to former corporate employees); In re Sealed Cases (Government
Records), 950 F.2d 736 (holding Braswell applies to former government officials); In re
Keller Fin. Services of Florida, Inc., WL 33244257, at *13 (2000-248 B.R. 859) (holding
that Braswell applies to former corporate director).
89 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated November 12, 1991, 957 F.2d at 810-11.

116

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. VII

the case law, while not dispositive on the issue, suggests that the collective
entity rule should be extended to former employees. 9 Second, the agency
relationship is not severed when employees depart from the corporation. 9'
Third, public policy strongly favors extending Braswell to former
employees.9 2
The Supreme Court's decisions suggest that the collective entity
rule extends to former employees.93 The Court has compelled individuals
to produce documents even though they were no longer associated with the
public entity. 94 The Court in Bellis, for example, held that the collective
entity rule applied to a lawyer even after he left the partnership. 95 -Bellis
dissolved his partnership with two other lawyers to practice law in another
firm. 96 Despite moving to a new location, Bellis left his former financial
records with the two remaining partners.97 Just before the issuance of the
subpoena, Bellis had the records brought to his new office. 98 Shortly after,
he was served with the subpoena ordering him to testify in front of a grand
jury and to provide all records made under the partnership that were in his
control. 99 The Court found that Bellis held the records in a "representative
capacity."''L The Court also reasoned in dicta that the "dissolution of a
corporation does not give the custodian of the corporate records any
90 See Bellis, 417 U.S. at 88 (holding lawyer could not claim privilege against self-

immunity after he left partnership); Wheeler, 226 U.S. at 489 (holding that individuals do
not gain privileges against self-incrimination after corporations disband); Keller Fin.
Services, WL 33244257, at *13 (relying on Bellis and Wheeler to prohibit former
employees from evoking privilege against self-incrimination); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Dated November 12, 1991, 957 F.2d 811 (relying on Bellis and Wheeler to prohibit former
employees from evoking privilege against self-incrimination).
9rIn re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated November 12, 1991, 957 F.2d at 812; Keller Fin.
Services, WL 33244257, at * 12-13.
92 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated November 12, 1991, 957 F.2d 807; In re Three
Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d at 185 (Justice Cabranes Dissenting).
93 See Bellis, 417 U.S. at 88 (holding that lawyer could not claim privilege against
self-incrimination after he left partnership); Wheeler v. U.S., 226 U.S. 478, 489 (1913)
(holding individuals do not gain privileges against self-incrimination after corporations
disband); see also Keller Fin. Services, WL 33244257, at *13 (reviewing Bellis and
Wheeler); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated November 12, 1991, 957 F.2d 811 (reviewing
Bellis and Wheeler).
94 See Bellis, 417 U.S. at 101 (lawyer of former partnership compelled to turn over
documents to government officials); Wheeler, 226 U.S. at 490 (holding former corporate
officers were compelled to turn over documents to government); see also In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Dated November 12, 1991, 957 F.2d at 812 (interoperating Bellis and Wheeler as
requiring former employees to produce cooperate documents in their possession).
9 See Bellis, 417 U.S. at 86-87.
9 Id. at 86.
97 Id.
98

Id.

99Id.
100 Bellis, 417 U.S. at 101.
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greater claim to his Fifth Amendment privilege."''1 1 Therefore, his
privilege against self-incrimination could not be utilized because 02the Court
did not deem Bellis an individual for Fifth Amendment purposes. 1
The Wheeler Court determined that the collective entity rule
obligates former officers of a dissolved corporation to comply with a
subpoena to produce documents. 10 3 In Wheeler, the defendant was the
treasurer of Wheeler & Shaw, Inc. 10 4 The corporation, however, dissolved
in April 1911, and all the business records and books went to Wheeler and
Shaw to be held jointly. 105 A year later, a the government gave a subpoena
to Wheeler and Shaw demanding that they submit all letters, telegrams,
and books pertaining to the company to the Grand Jury.' °6 The Court
determined that it was the "character of the books and papers" which made
them corporate rather than private. 0 7 Therefore, the former partners could
not use the Fifth Amendment as a shield from the production of
documents. 10 8 Additionally, the Supreme Court has explicitly refrained
from holding that former employees do not have an obligation to produce
subpoenaed documents. 109
Braswell also applies to former employees because the agency
relationship is not terminated when employment ends."0 The Court in
Braswell held that individuals who have corporate documents keep them as
representatives of the corporation."' The circuits extending the Braswell
rule reason that even after termination or resignation, the former employee2
continues to hold the documents as a representative of the corporation."1
When an employee removes documents from the corporation, he or she
retains their custody as a representative of the corporation and continues to

lot Id. at 97. Bellis conceded the issue of whether he would have had a greater Fifth
Amendment protection after the partnership ended. Id.
102

Id.

103 Wheeler, 226 U.S. at 489.

1'o Id. at 487.
105 Id. at 486.
'06
'07
108

Id. at 483.
Id. at 490.

See id. (concluding that documents corporate even though held by former officers).

Braswell did not establish an exception for former employees. In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Dated November 12, 1991,957 F.2d at 811; Keller Fin. Services, WL 33244257, at *13.
109 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated November 12, 1991, 957 F.2d at 811
"io Id. at 812 (1I1th Cir. 1992); Keller Fin. Services, WL 33244257, at *12-13.
I Braswell, 487 U.S. at 117-18; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated
November 12, 957 F.2d at 812 (citing to Braswell); Slonimsky, 2000 WL 1759721, at *1-2.
112 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated November 12, 957 F.2d at 812; In re Sealed
Case (Government Records) 950 F.2d 736, 740 ( D.C.Cir. 1991) (holding similar
obligations for former government employees to produce documents as former corporate
employees); see also In re Keller Fin. Services of Florida, Inc., WL 33244257, at *12
(following reasoning of In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated November 12).
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have an obligation to submit documents to the grand jury.'" 3 The focus is
on the "immutable character of the records as corporate documents" and
not on the status of employment. 114 Therefore, termination or resignation
has little effect on the representative nature in which the former employee
holds the records because the termination does not end the former
employee's custodianship of the documents. 15
Additionally, the circuits extending Braswell reason that broadening
the rule to include former employees is sound public policy."16 Excluding
former employees would undercut the force of the collective entity
doctrine and weaken the Braswell holding." 7 Most of the evidenee
proving corporate wrongdoing exists in the corporate documents. | !8 By
exempting former employees from the Braswell rule, corporations could
circumvent the grand jury's demands for corporate records.1 9 Employees
who take incriminating documents and then resign would easily avoid
individual criminal accountability by evading the judicial process. 20
Moreover, corporations under investigation would have a powerful
incentive to assist its employees in leaving with incriminating evidence
because the damaging 2information would be effectively suppressed under
the Fifth Amendment. ' '

113

In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated November 12, 957 F.2d at 812; Slonimsky, 2000

WL 1759721, at *1-2.
114 Keller Fin. Services, WL 33244257, at *12; Slonimsky, 2000 WL 1759721, at *2
(forcing records custodian of defunct businesses to comply with IRS subpoenas); see also
Wheeler, 226 U.S. at 490 (holding that character of corporate records did not change
because corporation defunct).
115 See Wheeler, 226 U.S. at 486-87 (president and treasurer jointly retained
possession of corporate books after corporation disbanded); see also In re Three Grand Jury
Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d at 185 (dissent interpreting Wheeler as saying that
former employees retain documents after they leave corporations); Slonimsky, 2000 WL
1759721, at *2 (if custodians continue to hold documents after employment ends, it is done
as corporate representative).
116 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated November 12, 1991, 957 F.2d at 810.
117 Id. The court was concerned that safe harbor for criminals would be created if
Braswell is not extended. Id.
l"8 Id. at 813.
119 Id. at 810
120 In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d at 184 (Justice
Cabranes Dissenting). The Second Circuit, however, argued that in the seventeen years it
has allowed former employees Fifth Amendment protection, there have been few reported
incidents of employees pilfering corporate documents and resignation to thwart an
impending subpoena. In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d at 182.
Additionally, the Second Circuit suggests that employees are still deterred from resigning
and absconding with corporate documents because separate charges of theft or obstruction
of justice may be brought against them. Id. The corporation also has the right to recover its
stolen documents in a replevin action. Id. at 182-83.
121 Id.
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Further, corporations are entities created by state statute intended to
benefit the public. 22 Both state law and corporate charters bind a
corporation.123 It follows then, that the government has the right to
investigate corporate books to ensure that corporations comply with all of
its rules and regulations. 24 If the court does not extend Braswell to former
employees, then the state franchising a corporation would not have the
ability to regulate the corporation and end any abuses and misuses of its
charter.125 Further, by providing former employees and corporations with a
loophole to circumvent the state's supervisory authority, society
suffers,
26
and the purpose behind creating a public corporation is defeated. 1
B. CircuitsDeclining to Extend the Braswell Rule to FormerEmployees
The Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have declined to extend
Braswell to former employees who have retained records from the
corporation, thereby allowing the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination to shield them from government subpoenas. 127 First, the
circuit courts reason that the prior Supreme Court precedents do not

122

See Hale 201 U.S. at 74; Wilson, 221 U.S. at 383. The corporation gets special

benefits from incorporation, but also subjects itself to the government's oversight to insure
that it is complying with its articles. Hale 201 U.S. at 74; Wilson, 221 U.S. at 383.
123 Hale 201 U.S. at 74; Wilson, 221 U.S. at 383. A corporation's existence is subject
to obeying the law of its creation. Id. An example of this restraint is that a corporation's
contracts must be within the power granted to it by its charter. Hale, 201 U.S. at 74-75.
124 Hale, 201 U.S. at 74-75.
The legislature has an implied right to review the
corporation's contracts to determine if it has violated the restrictions placed on its authority.
Id. It would be a flaw in the system if the state granting power to the corporation did not
have the ability to check whether corporations were misusing their franchise. See id.
Therefore, the state retains the power to check corporate records and books anytime. Id.
125 See Hale, 201 U.S. at 75 (asserting that government officials have authority to
inspect corporate books because it incarcerates corporations); Wilson, 221 U.S. at 382
(stating that government officials can demand access to corporate books to prevent
violations of laws).
126 See Hale, 201 U.S. at 75 (stating state and federal governments have oversight
of
corporate books to prevent abuses by corporations); Wilson, 221 U.S. at 380-81 (stating
state and federal government may investigate corporate documents to ensure corporate
franchise followed). Public business or its employees cannot claim Fifth Amendment
protection against self-incrimination because they hold their books and records for the
public good and not for private use. Wilson, 221 U.S. at 381.
127 In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d at 183 (three corporate
officers resigned from their division involved in corporate wrongdoing prior to subpoenas);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings,71 F.3d 723, 724 (1995) (holding that Braswell inapplicable
to employees after they leave corporate entity); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum
Dated June 13, 1983 and June 22, 1983, 722 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1983) (hereinafter Saxon
Industries) (former employee failed to produce documents after being ordered by court);
McLaughlin, 126 F.3d 130, 133 (1997) (dicta suggesting that former employees with stolen
corporate documents cannot use Braswell).
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28
preclude the Fifth Amendment's protection of former employees.
Second, the circuits argue that the agency relationship between the
corporation and the employee ceases to exist when the employment
ends.129 Third, the extension of Braswell may put former employees at
more of a risk than it puts current employees.1 30 Finally, these circuits
argue that the extension of the rule would harm the integrity of the judicial
system and that public
policy mandates the Braswell rule be limited only to
31
current employees.
The Supremacy Clause does not require the Second, Third, and
Ninth Circuits to apply the Braswell rule to former employees because no
prior Supreme Court decision has expanded the collective entity doctrine to
include individuals no longer employed by the corporation. 132 The circuits
that advocate the extension of the Braswell rule rely on the facts and
holdings in Hale and Wheeler.' 33 However, under the Second Circuit's
interpretation of the Hale case, the lawyer who left his partnership is not
considered a former employee for Fifth Amendment purposes because a
partnership is not fully concluded until the "winding up of the partnership
affairs is completed."'134 Moreover, the Supreme Court did not decide
Bellis based on the dissolution of the partnership, but rather on the premise
that a member of a small partnership must respond to the subpoena when
held in a representative capacity.1 35 The Second Circuit also argued that

128See In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d at 181 (holding
that
Hale and Wheeler do not limit former employees Fifth Amendment rights).
129 See In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d at 181
(determining
that once agency relationship ends, former employee holds documents as private
individual); Saxon Industries, 722 F.2d 981-82 (holding that former employee protected
against production of documents because he holds them individually).
130 See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 118 (Braswell provides procedural safeguards
for
employees compelled to give documents); see also In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas
Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d at 182 (Braswell's safeguard does not explicitly apply to former
employees); Saxon Industries, 722 F.2d at 986-87 (holding that corporate agency ends once
officer leaves corporation).
131 See In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d
at 183 (Fifth
Amendment places additional burdens on law enforcement and intended to prevent
compelled testimony).
132

See id. at 181.

133See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated November 12, 1991, 957 F.2d at 811

(explaining why Hale and Wheeler do not apply).
134 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated November 12, 1991, 957 F.2d at 811; Bellis,
417
U.S. at 96. The disbanding of the partnership alone does not end each partner's obligations
to one another. In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d at 181. The
partnership dissolves only after discharging all prior obligations. id. In Bellis, continued
outstanding obligations prevented the partnership from ending. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 97.
135Bellis, 417 U.S. at 96; see also Braswell, 487 U.S. at 107-08 (discussing Bellis); In
re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d at 181 (asserting that Bellis'
holding does not apply to former employees). Neither the President nor the Treasurer of the
corporation ever resigned their positions. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 101.
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the holding in the Wheeler decision does not create a precedent for
expanding the collective entity rule because the treasurer and the president
were considered to be a part of the corporation. 136 Additionally, the Court
in Wheeler based its decision on whether the documents were personal
or
37
corporate, rather than the employment status of the document holders. 1
The Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have refrained from
enlarging the sphere of the Braswell rule because the agency relationship
ends when the employee leaves the organization.' 38 The core of the
Braswell holding is that individuals producing corporate documents
pursuant to a subpoena are acting as an extension of the corporation
because a corporation is a legal fiction and cannot act for itself. 39 Once
the employee leaves the corporation, however, he or she is no longer acting

136

See Wheeler, 226 U.S. at 487 (stating corporate officers, who never resigned,

obligated to comply with subpoena for corporate documents); see also In re Three Grand
Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d at 181 (arguing that Wheeler not decided based on
employment status, but rather nature of documents).
17 Wheeler, 226 U.S. at 490. The Wheeler Court looked to the prior decision in
Wilson to conclude that the termination of the corporation before the grand jury subpoena
does not change the character of the documents from corporate to private. Wheeler, 226
U.S. at 489-90. Thus, the employment relationship does not have much affect on the
analysis. In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d at 181. The Braswell
Court held that current employees must produce documents when subpoenaed, but made no
comment on the obligations of former employees. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 110 (stating
that current employees hold documents as representatives for corporation); see also In re
Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d at 181 (interpreting Braswell as
applying only to current employees and not to former employees). In Braswell, the sole
employee of his own corporation was in business at the time of the subpoena production
and his refusal to testify. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 10 1-2.
138 See In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 191
F.3d at 181 (holding that
when agency relationship ends, former employees no longer must produce documents for
corporations); McLaughlin, 126 F.3d at 134. (noting Braswell's inapplicability to former
employees because employees hold documents as representatives); Saxon Industries, 722
F.2d at 986-87 (holding that former employees hold documents as individuals and not as
corporate representatives); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 71 F.3d 723, 724 (1995)
(employees who do not work for the corporation cannot be compelled to produce records).
139 See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 118 (noting employees hold corporate documents on
behalf of corporations); In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d at 181
(interoperating Braswell as obligating only current employees to produce documents on
behalf of corporations); What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language
Of A Legal Fiction, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1745, 1751 (2001) (commenting on nature of
corporations). Corporations have been described as "an artificial being, invisible,
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being a mere creature of law, it
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either
expressly or incidentally to its very existence." What We Talk About When We Talk About
Persons: The Language Of A Legal Fiction, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1753 (2001)
(quoting Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)).
Hale denied to give the corporation a Fifth Amendment privilege, reasoning that the right
belonged only to natural persons. Hale, 201 U.S. at 74.
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40
as an extension of the entity, but rather as an autonomous individual.
The Boyd holding, though diminished in strength after Hale, continues to
protect the papers found in a private person's possession. '4'
Upon
termination or resignation, the former employee stops holding documents
142
in a representative capacity or as a corporate custodian of the records.
Any request for documents by the government, therefore, requires
the
43
individual to act in his personal, rather than corporate, capacity. 1
The Second circuit, in declining to extend the Braswell holding to
former employees, reasons that the act of producing the documents might
put the former workers at a greater disadvantage than their curreht
corporate employee counterparts. 44 When corporate employees turn over
145
documents, they sometimes implicate themselves in criminal activity.
Braswell created a rule of procedure prohibiting the government from
using the fact that the custodian produced the information pursuant to a
subpoena when the government individually prosecutes the employee. 146
The purpose of Braswell's evidentiary rule is to reduce the selfincriminating document's effect on the individual employee when he/she
executes his/her obligation as a corporate employee to produce the
documents. 147 It is, however, uncertain whether the Braswell evidentiary
rule would apply to former employees in the same way that it does current
employees. 48 Further, the Braswell holding is not a constitutional
requirement of the Fifth Amendment and, therefore, may preclude former
employees from benefiting from the procedural safeguard. 149 Without the
personal protection articulated in Braswell, the government can argue that

140 See In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d
at 181 (Braswell
cannot apply to former employees because they would be compelled to produce personal
documents). By acting in their personal interest rather than as a part of the corporation, the
former employee no longer fulfills the purpose articulated in Braswell. See id.
(interoperating Braswell's purpose as requiring employee's to produce documents as agents
on cororation's behalf).
,4
See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 638.
142 In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d at 181.
143 Id. Braswell does not require public corporations to force the production of
documents by its former employees. Id. Additionally, the fiduciary relationship between
the empiloyer and the former employee does not continue after termination. Id.
See In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d at 182 (arguing that
Braswell rule only specifies procedural protections for current and not former employees).
145 See In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d at 182
(discussing
Braswell's procedural rule barring government disclosure to jurors of how documents
obtained).
146 Braswell, 487 U.S. at 117-8.
147 In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d at 182.

148
149

Id.
Id. There is also nothing in the Fifth Amendment that precludes the government

from going after the documents without a subpoena. In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas
Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d at 183.
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the custodian absconded
with the documents because he believed them to
0
prove his guilt.15
The circuits refraining from extending the Braswell rule considered
the policy behind the rule against self-incrimination. 151 The purpose of the
Fifth Amendment, as idealized by its authors, is not to protect the innocent,
but rather preserve the integrity of the system. 152 The extension of the
Fifth Amendment privilege to former employees is a sound policy because
it forces the government to prove its entire case. 153 An extension of
Braswell would undermine the purpose of the right against selfincrimination because the government could compel the former employee
to incriminate himself through the production of the documents rather than
present evidence of his guilt. 15 4 Additionally, the more numerous and
expansive the criminal activity, the broader the privilege against selfincrimination becomes.155 Former employees, for example, would not only
be compelled to incriminate themselves by introducing the contents of
specific corporate documents under their control but also be required to
admit their theft and failure to return the documents from their past
employer. 156
Prosecutors may also charge former employees with
obstruction of justice. 157 The added crimes provide justification for
58
extending the privilege against self-incrimination. 1
V. CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit, D.C. Circuit, and the United States
Bankruptcy Courts are correct to extend Braswell to include former
150 Saxon Industries, 722 F.2d at 987. Fisher states that the circumstances of each

case affect whether the act of production would be incriminating enough to invoke the Fifth
Amendment. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410. Producing a document is significant enough to
warrant protection when producing it "poses a realistic threat of incrimination" and would
add to the "government's sum total of information." Id. at 412. A former employee may
have obtained the documents illegally and compelling him to produce them would force the
former employee to provide the evidence of his theft. Saxon Industries, 722 F.2d at 986-7.
151 In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d at 183.
152

Id.

153 Id.
154 See id. (arguing that extending Braswell would lighten governments burden). The

Supreme Court articulated that "the basic purposes that lie behind the privilege against selfincrimination do not relate to protecting the innocent from conviction, but rather to
preserving the integrity of a judicial system in which even the guilty are not to be convicted
unless the prosecution shoulder the entire load." Tehan v. United States ex rel Shott, 382
U.S. 406,415 (1966).
155 See In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 191 F.3d at 183 (describing
Fifth Amendment's scope).
156 Id. Production of the documents would be evidence of further crimes.
157 Id.
158 See id. (advocating Fifth Amendment protection for former employees
who possess
corporate documents).
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employees. The reasoning behind Braswell's extension, favoring the
nature of the documents over the agency of the employees, is consistent
with the Supreme Court's prior cases. Additionally, former employees and
their previous corporate employers can contort the Fifth Amendment
privilege into a license for lawlessness. If Braswell were limited to current
employees, there would be reverberations on the state's ability to safeguard
its citizens and prosecution's ability to punish corporate offenders.
The Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits' agency rationale for
extending Braswell to former employees does not conform with Supreme
Court precedents. These circuits incorrectly make the employment status
of the particular person the decisive factor and not the nature of the
documents in question. The Court has supported the extension of Braswell
throughout its development of the collective entity doctrine. The Boyd
holding, for example, extends the Fifth Amendment privilege only to
private papers of an individual and not the papers of the corporation. 159
Additionally, in Wheeler, the Court held that the character of the papers
made them corporate, not the status of the defunct company. 16° Likewise,
in Wilson, the Court prohibited the company president from using his Fifth
Amendment protection to withhold business documents that implicated
him in criminal activity.' 6' The Court reasoned that the documents were
public. 62 These cases demonstrate that the Court's focus has been on the
character of the document and not the person holding it.
The Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits' exclusion of former
employees from the Braswell rule will affect how felonious corporations
and employees operate. By allowing former employees to have a Fifth
Amendment protection, the courts would create a loophole allowing
employees to take corporate documents and resign without having to turn
the information over to the government when subpoenaed. In essence, the
corporations would be able to hide behind their previous employer's
protection to avoid judicial accountability. Offending corporations on the
verge of discovery could purge their corporation of incriminating
documents by transferring them to an implicated worker and then firing
him or her. In this situation, the employee benefits because he or she
avoids jail, and the corporation benefits because it has blocked the
production of the documents by the worker's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. This structural crack in the corporate entity
doctrine would collapse the entire concept because the corporations could
always avoid production by conspiring with former employees.
159

See In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated January 29, 1999, 191

F.3d at 177 (interpreting Boyd).
160 Wheeler, 226 U.S. at 490.
161 Wilson, 221 U.S. at 384.
162 Id.
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The Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits' protection to corporations
would impair the prosecution's ability to gather evidence to convict
corporate criminals. Justice Rehnquist noted in Braswell's majority
opinion that white-collar crime was "the most serious and all-pervasive
crime problem in America today." 163 Additionally, the decision noted that
it was one of the most difficult challenges facing law enforcement."
Corporate crimes are types of white-collar crimes unified by the common
theme of the perpetrator acting for the benefit of the business entity, rather
than solely for him or herself. 65 Though Justice Rehnquist wrote Braswell
over a decade ago, corporate crime is still flourishing and posing an even
greater problem for law enforcement agents.166 Though there is a need to
fight this growing and destructive crime, prosecutors and investigators
often find themselves at a considerable disadvantage because corporations
have greater recourse and can insolate themselves from the state's attempts
to uncover incriminating documents. 67 Limiting the Braswell rule's reach
to current employees, and not extending it to former employees, would
only make it more difficult for prosecutors and investigators to discover
corporate crime and its individual offenders than it is at present. In sum,
corporations would have another escape route to evade prosecutorial
detection.
The Second, Third, and Ninth Circuit, by limiting the Braswell rule
to current employees only, would prevent the state from effectively
regulating the corporations that it franchises and charters. Corporations
would hide behind their former employees, serving their self-interests
rather than the interests of the public for which they were created. The
state would be reduced to nothing more than a toothless tiger unable to
enforce the rules it creates. Thus, the corporation would evade the
regulatory authority of the state and have the free reign to abuse its charter
and the public's trust.

Aaron Finesilver

163 Braswell, 487 U.S. at 116.
16 Id. at 115.
165 See generally Braswell, 487 U.S. 99; see BENSON, supra note 1, at 4 (defining

corporate crime).
166 See BENSON, supra note 1, at 20 (discussing difficulty involved in detecting
corporate crime).
167See id. at 26-7 (describing tactics corporations take to thwart law enforcement's
efforts to detect crime).

